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Introduction
On December 1, 1990, Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights
Act (VARA),' which amended the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright
Act).2 VARA is the first federal legislation giving American artists lim-
ited moral rights in their works.3 European artists have enjoyed the full
extent of such rights since the late nineteenth century under the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.4 The
Berne Convention recognizes (1) the right to disclose the work, (2) the
right to withdraw or disavow the work, (3) the right to attribute the work
to one's own creative efforts, and (4) the right to protect the work's integ-
rity.5 Though the Copyright Act guaranteed artists' economic interests
in their works, it did not guard their expression. Before VARA's passage
the Second Circuit observed, "American copyright law, as presently
written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for
their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than
the personal, rights of authors." 6
While VARA represents a uniform federal grant of moral rights, a
number of states have enacted laws providing artists with similar protec-
tion. These states include California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island.7 Courts must decide whether the Copyright
Act, as amended by VARA, preempts these statutes.
This Note will examine the preemption provisions of the Copyright
Act, as it existed and as it has been amended by VARA, to determine the
character and scope of federal copyright supremacy. VARA will then be
analyzed to discern the subject matter and rights actually covered. Spe-
cial attention will be paid to VARA's legislative history to shed light on
its intended application and preemptive effect. At each stage of the anal-
1. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5128
(1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 608-610 (Supp. III
1991)).
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)); see 2 MELVILLE B. NIM-
MER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21[B], at 8-265 (1991).
3. Moral rights allow an artist to protect the expression of his work after its sale or other
transfer to a third party. Common moral rights include the right to prevent the distortion or
mutilation of a work, the right to be recognized as its author, and, in certain cases, the right to
disavow authorship of a work.
4. See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. Toward a Federal Sys-
tem of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945 (1990).
5. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE Doc-
TRINES 855 (2d ed. 1981) (citing Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of
Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465 (1968)).
6. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 & n.18 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT].
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ysis, any corresponding provisions of the California, Massachusetts, and
New York artists' rights laws will be considered,/and any overlap with
federal coverage identified. Finally, this Note will discuss the existence
and degree of preemption in each case.
I
Preemption Provisions
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act, codified at Title 17 of the United States Code,
has a preemption clause embodied in § 301:
§ 301 - Preemption with respect to other laws.
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 ... and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 .. .are gov-
erned exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any
such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law
or statutes of any State.
8
This language shows that Congress decided to preempt all parallel state-
based rights. According to House Report 1476,
The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights
under the common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to
copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of the
Federal copyright law .... All corresponding State laws, whether
common law or statutory, are preempted and abrogated. 9
Section 301(a) incorporates a two-part test in determining whether
preemption applies. First, the state right must be equivalent to a right
granted by the Copyright Act. Second, it must apply to a work within
the Copyright Act's scope.' ° While § 102 of the Copyright Act provides
a straightforward list of copyrightable subject matter, I" the determina-
tion of whether state rights are "equivalent" is often less clear. The term,
"equivalent" is construed broadly and subsumes rights both broader and
more narrow than those guarded by federal law.' 2 "The preemption is
8. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
9. ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 765 (3d ed. 1989) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-33 (1976)).
10. Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1985).
11. Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act provides that "[c]opyright protection subsists, in
original works of authorship [of] the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying
music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
12. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B], at
1-12 (1991).
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intended to be complete with respect to any work coming within the
scope of the ... [Copyright Act], even though it would not be given as
broad protection as might otherwise be available to it under the common
law." 3 As a result, a state-based right may be preempted if it falls within
the general realm of copyright, even if "the precise contours of the right
differ from any of those [rights] contained in section 106 [of the Copy-
right Act]." 4
Despite Congress' liberal interpretation of an "equivalent" right, the
Copyright Act, without VARA, would probably not have preempted
most applications of state moral rights laws."5 Though encompassing
similar subject matter, the states' specific provisions for the moral rights
of attribution and integrity are unlike the economic protection of the
Copyright Act. 16 Moreover, § 301 provides:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under
the common law or statutes of any State with respect to...
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 ....
Because the state rights of integrity and attribution are distinct from
those of the Copyright Act, there would have been no apparent preemp-
tion under § 301 of the Copyright Act as it existed prior to VARA.
B. The Visual Artists Rights Act
VARA carries its own preemption provision, which was added to
§ 301 of the Copyright Act. Section 301(f) of the amended Copyright
Act reads as follows:
(1) On or after the effective date ... of the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990 [June 1, 1991], all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of
visual art to which the rights conferred by section 106A apply are gov-
erned exclusively by section 106A .... Thereafter, no person is enti-
tled to any such right or equivalent right in an work of visual art-
under the common law or statutes of any State.'
Again, Congress requires the same dual test of preemption: one part
relating to equivalent rights and the other to subject matter (i.e. "works
13. Id. at n. 33 (quoting SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTRAR OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, 89TH
CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6 (House Comm. Print 1965)).
14. Id. at 1-12.
15. Though few cases address this point, at least one court found the New York Artists'
Authorship Rights Act immune from federal preemption. See Wojnarowicz v. American
Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
16. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b).
18. Id. § 301(0(1).
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of visual art to which the rights conferred by section 106A apply"). The
amended Copyright Act, therefore, is much more likely to preempt state
moral rights laws since § 301(f) not only employs the original preemp-
tion language, but also applies to the VARA-created rights appearing in
§ 106A of the amended Copyright Act. 9 Read literally, the statute
might only preempt the state rights coinciding exactly with those of the
amended Copyright Act. However, given the broad interpretation of
"equivalent" right in § 301, courts are likely to extend preemption.2° In-
deed, Professor Edward Damich warned a Senate subcommittee that
"the preemption provision [of VARA] is so worded that there is a very
real danger that more comprehensive, existing protection will be
preempted."'"
Legislative history shows Congress was receptive to those advocat-
ing preemption in the interest of uniform national law. According to
House Report 514,
Witnesses at the Subcommittee hearings strongly supported the enact-
ment of a uniform Federal law and the concomitant preemption of
State law where appropriate. As the Registrar of Copyrights noted:
"A single Federal system is preferable to State statutes or municipal
ordinances on moral rights because creativity is stimulated more effec-
tively on a uniform, national basis.",
22
At the same time, VARA's drafters intended to maintain some state
moral rights, as evidenced by the parallels between the new § 301(f)(2)
and § 301(b) of the Copyright Act. Section 301(f)(2) states, in relevant
part:
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to...
(B) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect
to works of visual art .... 23
The intent to preserve state-based rights is also reflected in VARA's legis-
lative history, which asserts that "[s]tate artists' rights laws that grant
rights not equivalent to those accorded under the proposed law are not
19. Id. §§ 301(a), (f)(1).
20. Damich, supra note 4, at 972.
21. Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 33
(1989) [hereinafter Hearings on Moral Rights] (statement of Edward J. Damich, Associate
Professor of Law, George Mason University).
22. REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (quoting Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearings on
H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement of Hon.
Ralph Oman, Registrar of Copyrights)).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2).
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preempted, even when they relate to works covered . *.".."24 To this
extent, VARA maintains traditional preemption doctrine.
While the exact scope of preemption is debatable, any determination
of preemptive effect requires an examination of VARA's statutory lan-
guage to discern the rights and subject matter actually covered. Once the
scope of the federal and state laws are revealed, potential overlap can be
identified.
II
Analysis of the Federal and State Acts
A. Applicable Subject Matter
1. The Visual Artists Rights Act
VARA amended § 101 of the Copyright Act to include the defini-
tion of a "work of visual art." The delineation of this term is important
because VARA only covers "works of visual art."2 According to § 101,
a "work of visual art" is:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy,
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecu-
tively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multi-
ple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other
identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively num-
bered by the author.26
This definition targets a small portion of the "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural" works encompassed by § 101 and sets them apart for extra
protection. From a public policy standpoint, the selection seems appro-
priate since either an original work of visual art or its limited editions are
"the copies most closely supervised by the artist, in which the communi-
cation between artist and public is most intense."27
Despite the precise language of § 101 of the amended Copyright
Act, there may be confusion regarding a creation's qualification as a
"work of visual art." For example, the designation of a "still photo-
graphic image produced for exhibition purposes only" can be problem-
atic. If a picture is taken for pleasure and later exhibited, or exhibited
24. REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
26. Id. § 101.
27. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings on Visual Artists Rights Act]
(statement of Jane C. Ginsburg, Associate Professor, Columbia University School of Law).
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after an unsuccessful publication attempt, the photograph's protection
under VARA is questionable. Conversely, the subsequent unrestricted
sale of a photo produced exclusively for exhibit might force it beyond the
definition. Yet, according to the legislative history, "[i]t is the initial pur-
pose for which the image is produced that controls whether a photograph
is covered. Thus a qualifying photograph will not fall outside the ambit
of the bill's protection simply because it is later used for non-exhibition
purposes."2 Such later uses will not deprive the original photo or its
limited series of protection, regardless of how many signed or unsigned
copies are made.
Another potential ambiguity lies in VARA's endorsement of a "lim-
ited edition" painting or drawing. Perhaps the phrase was intended only
to modify "prints or sculptures," because even a prolific artist would be
hard pressed to craft enough copies of a painting or a drawing to accu-
mulate a "limited edition." 29 The drafters were probably thinking of re-
productive limited editions in this context. 30 Moreover, non-traditional
creations may not easily fit the "work of visual art" definition-a work,
for example, consisting "of sand that had been separately gathered, bot-
tled, and meticulously labeled by the artist."'"
However, the interpretation of a "work of visual art" is not entirely
rigid. House Report 514 suggests that "whether a particular work falls
within the definition should not depend on the medium or materials
used."' 32 Accordingly, "painting" would include murals, canvas works,
and related creations; "sculpture" would subsume castings, carvings,
modelings, constructions, and similar pieces; and "print" would encom-
pass such works as lithographs, serigraphs, and etchings.33 For the most
part, "courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards
of the artistic community in determining whether a particular work falls
within the scope of the definition."
'34
The restrictive characterization of "work of visual art" was deliber-
ate and "is a critical underpinning of the limited scope of the bill."' 35 As
Representative Edward Markey noted before a House subcommittee,
"[W]e have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of
art that will be covered .... [T]his legislation covers only a very select
28. REPORT, supra note 7, at 12.
29. Damich, supra note 4, at 952.
30. Id.
31. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-268 n. 87 (quoting Hearings on Moral Rights, supra note
21, at 105 (statement of Peter H. Karlen)).
32. REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 11-12.
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group of artists . ...,,3' The narrow definition was likely due in part to
the efforts of affected industries opposing moral rights legislation.
The Committee for America's Copyright Community (CACC), a
group including some of the nation's largest and most prestigious pub-
lishers, filmmakers, and broadcasters, opposed a broad scope of covered
works.37 During hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks, CACC's representative testified as follows:
CACC believes that expressly incorporating moral rights into fed-
eral law would threaten the on-going success of our copyright indus-
tries. In sum, we believe that moral rights would (1) inject great
uncertainty into the marketplace and thus make it extremely difficult
for copyrighted works to be made available to both primary and ancil-
lary markets; (2) cause copyright owners and users to worry that even
their most routine activities could subject them to lawsuits; (3) seri-
ously inhibit the ability of many of our copyright-intensive industries
to attract potential investors; (4) put federal judges in the position of
making aesthetic judgments about the quality of copyrighted works;
(5) conflict with key provisions of the Copyright Act; and (6) be at
odds with our nation's commitment to freedom of contract. Therefore,
CACC urges Congress to adhere to its long-standing practice of not
expressly incorporating moral rights into federal law, including the
Copyright Act. 1
The motion picture industry also opposed the introduction of moral
rights. Peter Nolan, vice president and counsel of The Walt Disney
Company testified:
[M]oral rights legislation would be unnecessary, unjustified, and an un-
warranted encumbrance on our ability to broadly distribute our copy-
righted works.
The consequences of legislating moral rights would be wholly in-
consistent with the public interest goals of the copyright clause of the
Constitution and the Copyright Act .... [G]ranting personal benefits
to non-copyright holders... could have the effect of keeping creative
works out of the public's hands.
3 9
More to the point, Nolan felt that allowing artists certain moral rights to
video works "would hamper ... [Disney's] ability to adapt motion pic-
36. Id. at 12 (quoting Hearings on Visual Artists Rights Act, supra note 27, at 2 (statement
of Hon. Edward Markey) (alteration and omissions in original)).
37. Members include: Association of American Publishers, Association of Independent
Television Stations, Inc., The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., International Communications Industries Association, Information Industry Association,
McGraw-Hill, Inc., Magazine Publishers of America, Motion Picture Association of America,
National Association of Broadcasters, National Newspaper Association, Omni Publications
International Ltd., The Reader's Digest Association Inc., Recording Industry Association of
America, Time Inc., Times Mirror, Training Media Association, Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc., and Warner Communications, Inc. Hearings on Moral Rights, supra note 21, at 609.
38. Id. at 569 (statement of Michael R. Klipper, representing CACC).




tures for the numerous markets that are essential to ... [a motion pic-
ture's] financial success."'  Nolan concluded that moral rights
legislation "is bad for our business. This is bad for our nation's balance
of trade. This is bad for the public. On the whole, that makes the pur-
suit of moral rights for motion pictures simply a bad idea."41
The newspaper and magazine industries were similarly concerned
with the proposed moral rights law. R. Jack Fishman, chairman of the
government relations committee of the National Newspaper Association,
testified:
[T]he imposition of a moral rights system would not permit the news-
paper industry to continue to do business and serve the public in the
same fashion that it has for decades. Moral rights and the newspaper
industry simply are not compatible .... 42
Victor Kovner, chairman of the legal affairs committee of the Magazine
Publishers of America, asserted:
Our firm conviction was (and remains ... ) that the doctrine of "moral
rights", (sic] if transported into American copyright law, would
greatly alter the delicate balance of rights which is the foundation of
our copyright system ....
... [T]he question is whether Congress should enact such a statute
.... We submit that the answer, clearly, is "no.",
43
Such industry concerns did not go unheeded. VARA's legislative
history shows that the concerns of newspaper and periodical publishers
were recognized and accommodated: "[M]any photographs are pro-
duced for use by newspapers and magazines.., and are specifically ex-
cluded by the definition .... " Moviemakers were similarly placated;
House Report 514 noted that granting moral rights to audiovisual artists
"might conflict with the distribution and marketing of these works."45
On balance, VARA may succeed where previous moral rights initiatives
failed "[b]ecause ... its limited nature ... protects the legitimate inter-
ests of visual artists without inhibiting the rights of copyright owners and
users, and without undue interference with the successful operation of
the American copyright system."46
Though VARA apparently represents a consensus between artists
and industry, the latter may have received the better bargain. As finally
40. Id. at 1042.
41. Id. at 1064.
42. Id. at 682 (statement of R. Jack Fishman, chairman, government relations committee,
National Newspaper Association).
43. Id. at 645-46 (statement of Victor A. Kovner, chairman, legal affairs committee, Mag-
azine Publishers of America).
44. REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 10.
1993]
drafted, the definition of a "work of visual art" contains an extensive list
of exclusions, including:
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual work, book,
magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information ser-
vice, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire ....
The statutory language and legislative history demonstrate VARA's
limited subject matter coverage. To determine the existence and degree
of federal preemption, the subject matter of the state laws must also be
examined.
2. The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act
In 1984, the New York State Assembly passed the Artists' Author-
ship Rights Act, now codified in various sections of the Arts and Cul-
tural Affairs Law (New York Act).48 The law was enacted "to protect
the rights and reputations of New York artists," as well as to safeguard
art and to help maintain New York's status as a "cultural mecca and a
forerunner in arts legislation."49
In terms of subject matter, the rights created by the New York Act
"apply only to works of fine art or limited edition multiples of not more
than three hundred copies knowingly displayed in a place accessible to
the public, published or reproduced in ... [New York] state."50 "Fine
art" is defined as "a painting, sculpture, drawing, or work of graphic art,
and print, but not multiples."51 "Limited edition" is characterized as
"works of art produced from a master, all of which are the same image
and bear numbers or other markings to denote the limited production
thereof to a stated maximum number of multiples ....""
The works of "fine art" to which the New York Act applies are
quite similar to the "works of visual art" covered by VARA. Both laws
specify the terms "painting," "sculpture," "drawing," and "print.
5 3
Both extend protection to a limited series of numbered reproductions;
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
48. Artists' Authorship Rights Act, ch. 849, § 1, 1984 Stat. (codified at N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 12.01, 12.03, 13.01, 13.03, 13.05, 13.07, 14.01, 14.03, 15.01, 15.03,
15.05, 15.07, 15.09, 15.11, 15.13, 15.15, 15.17, 15.19, 16.01 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
49. Sarah A. Smith, Note, The New York Artists'Authorship Rights Act. Increased Protec-
tion and Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 170 (1984).
50. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(e).
51. Id. § 11.01(9).
52. Id. § 11.01(10).
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(9).
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however, the New York Act covers editions of up to 300 copies, while
VARA only protects series of 200 copies or fewer.54 Other differences
include the lack of a signature, a prerequisite for coverage under the New
York Act, and the requirements that the work be "published or repro-
duced" in New York State and "knowingly displayed" in a public
place." Still, these distinctions relate more to procedural formalities
than to the works at issue. Since nearly all subject matter within the
New York Act is also covered by VARA, most applications of the state
law would be preempted to the extent federal law grants the same rights.
However, where the New York Act covers subject matter beyond
VARA's scope, preemption would not apply. The 201st print in a 300-
copy edition presents a good example. Since federal law only grants pro-
tection to reproductions of 200 or fewer copies, the 201st copy lies be-
yond its reach, rendering VARA inapplicable. Yet, the 201st print would
find protection under the New York Act which extends coverage to re-
productive series of up to 300 copies. As a result, there would be no
preemption of the New York Act's application to prints 201 through
300.
3. The California Art Preservation Act
California was the first state to enact moral rights legislation,
through the California Art Preservation Act (California Act), effective
August 1, 1979."6 Codified at section 987 of the Civil Code, it reads:
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical altera-
tion or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's
personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation, and artists there-
fore have an interest in protecting their works of fine art against any
alteration or destruction; and that there is also a public interest in pre-
serving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.57
The California Act defines "fine art" as "an original painting, sculp-
ture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized qual-
ity, but shall not include work prepared under contract for commercial
use by its purchaser. 51 8 This characterization resembles VARA's "work
of visual art" in that it specifies a painting, sculpture, or drawing.
Whether the California Act covers limited reproductions is unclear.
Though the California Act is silent, Peter Karlen notes that "[t]he re-
54. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 with 17 U.S.C. § 101.
55. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(e).
56. The California Art Preservation Act, ch. 409, § 3, 1979 Stat. (codified as amended at
CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1993)); see also Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights In Califor-
nia, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 675, 685 (1982).
57. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a).
58. Id. § 987(b)(2).
19931
quirements that the works befine art and original do not preclude protec-
tion of multiple 'originals.' "'I
Another uncertainty in the California Act stems from the require-
ment that works be "of recognized quality." According to Civil Code
section 987(0, "In determining whether a work of fine art is of recog-
nized quality, the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of artists, art
dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, and other persons
involved with the creation or marketing of fine art."'  This provision
serves as a guide, but cannot predict which works suffice.
Interestingly, the California Act's definition of "fine art" includes
works "in glass," a provision without apparent parallel in VARA.6" As-
suming the reference is to glass works other than sculpture, California's
law presumably protects such works as two-dimensional stained glass
windows and inlays. Photographs are apparently not considered works
of fine art by California, and in this respect the California Act differs
from VARA.62 However, the majority of works California law protects,
namely paintings, drawings, and sculpture, fall within VARA's scope.63
As a result, most applications of the California Act probably meet the
subject matter prong of VARA's two-part preemption test.'
4. The Massachusetts Art Preservation Act
On January 8, 1985, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts approved
the Art Preservation Act, codified at chapter 231, section 85S of the Mas-
sachusetts General Laws (Massachusetts Act).65 The preamble to the
Massachusetts Act essentially mirrors that of the California Act: "The
general court hereby finds and declares that ... artists ... have an inter-
est in protecting their works of fine art against ... alteration or destruc-
tion ... ."" Under the statute, "fine art" means "any original work of
visual or graphic art of any media which shall include, but [is] not lim-
ited to, any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft object, photograph,
audio or video tape, film, hologram, or any combination thereof, of rec-
ognized quality."67 Similar to the California Act, the Massachusetts Act
looks to art experts and dealers to determine whether a work is "of rec-
59. Karlen, supra note 56, at 695.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(0.
61. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 with CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2).
62. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 with CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2).
63. See supra text accompanying note 61.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1).
65. Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, ch. 488, § 1, 1984 Stat. (codified at MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1993)).
66. Id. § 85S(a).
67. Id. § 85S(b).
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ognized quality."6 Surprisingly, the Massachusetts Act also applies to
films, sound recordings, and videotapes, which are works specifically ex-
cluded by VARA and omitted by the New York and California Acts.6 9
In the words of one commentator, "By including film in the definition of
fine art, the Massachusetts legislature may have bitten off more than the
legal system can chew."
'70
The Massachusetts Act obviously covers more subject matter than
VARA. To the extent the protection overlaps, as in the case of paintings,
prints, drawings, sculptures, and certain photographs, the subject matter
prong of VARA's preemption test is satisfied.71 However, the coverage
that the Massachusetts Act accords film, video and audio creations may
remain unaffected by § 301. Preemption is only triggered by "rights that
are equivalent to any of the rights conferred by Section 106A with re-
spect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by section 106A
apply."72 The amended § 106A "works of visual art" applies to those
items defined in § 101 and thus specifically excludes "motion picture[s]
or other audiovisual work[s]." 73 Thus, even when the state protects
equivalent rights, an application of state rights to works beyond the
scope of § 101 would fail to meet the subject matter test and thus escape
preemption.74
VARA's legislative history indicates that the protection given film,
audio and visual works by the Massachusetts Act would endure. Ac-
cording to House Report 514, "Consistent with current law on preemp-
tion for economic rights, the new Federal law will not preempt State
causes of action relating to works that are not covered by the law, such as
audiovisual works ....
Both the California and New York Acts generally cover the same
subject matter as VARA. As a result, their application will face preemp-
tion in most instances.76 The protection given audiovisual works by the
Massachusetts Act lies beyond VARA's protection and would escape pre-
emption. However, even where a state act and VARA share common
68. Id. § 85S(0.
69. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 with CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) and N.Y. ARTS & CULT.
AFF. LAW § 11.01(9); see also supra text accompanying notes 26, 51, 58.
70. Vance R. Koven, Observations on the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, 71 MASS. L.
REV. 101, 106 (1986).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1).
72. Id. § 301(0 (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 101.
74. Id. § 301(0(1).
75. REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (emphasis added). Conversely, if the work were within
§ 101, but the right accorded it exceeded that granted by § 106A, the law would be preempted.
Id.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1).
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subject matter, applications of state law will endure so long as non-
equivalent rights are involved."" The next step, then, is to examine the
respective rights under each act.
B. The Right of Attribution
1. The Visual Artists Rights Act
The moral right of attribution essentially allows an artist "to control
the association of his name with the work."78 The right of attribution
includes: (1) the right to be recognized as author under one's legal name
or pseudonym, (2) the right to disclaim authorship of one's work, and (3)
the right to anonymous creation.79 VARA incorporates a limited attribu-
tion right, set forth in § 106A(a)(1) and (2) of the amended Copyright
Act:
(a) Rights of attribution . . .Subject to section 107 [fair use] and
independent of the exclusive rights provided in section 106 [traditional
copyright], the author of a work of visual art-
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the
author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation .... 80
The first two rights are relatively straightforward; § 106A(a)(1) lets
an artist claim authorship and deny creation of another's work. The
right to assert authorship seems hollow, however, since anyone can claim
authorship of any work. Perhaps in application this provision will better
secure the true author as the legally recognized creator.
The third privilege, dealing with disavowal of authorship in the
event of a work's modification, is more complex.8" At first glance the
right appears broad, since it applies whether the modification is inten-
tional or negligent.82 Creators can block the use of their names on pro-
tected works so long as endorsement would harm their honor or
reputation. Yet the type of modification, mutilation or distortion that
would be prejudicial to honor or reputation is open to question. Without
some idea of the applicable standard, the scope of the right is unclear.
77. See supra text accompanying note 33.
78. Damich, supra note 4, at 949.
79. Id.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
81. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
82. Damich, supra note 4, at 958.
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According to House Report 514, "The formulation for determining
whether harm to honor or reputation exists must of necessity be flexible.
The trier of fact must examine the way in which work has been modified
and the professional reputation of the author of the work."83 This state-
ment appears to rule out both a subjective test of the artist's own estima-
tion of prejudicial effect and an objective defamation standard requiring
proof of the artist's character.8 4 The report further suggests use of expert
testimony, and concludes that "[w]hile no per se rule exists, modification
of a work of recognized stature will generally establish harm to honor or
reputation."8 " This determination is unsatisfactory since "work of recog-
nized stature" begs definition. Other uncertainties involve the right to
remove names from works or attribute them with disclaimers.86
Exceptions to VARA's right of attribution include the depiction or
portrayal of covered artwork in non-protected subject matter.8 7 A poster
showing a painting or drawing need not include the artist's name, and a
creator incorrectly identified with the depicted art cannot use the right of
attribution to deny authorship. 8 According to VARA's legislative
history,
[A] newspaper, book, or magazine may include a photograph of a
painting or a piece of sculpture. A motion picture may include a scene
in an art gallery. The exclusion from the definition of a work of visual
art would be of little or no value if these industries could be held liable
under section 106A for the manner in which they depict, portray,
reproduce, or otherwise make use of such a work.
Though the drafters suggest relatively innocuous applications of the
exception, Nimmer cites more disturbing examples.90 A museum could
sell postcards of a painting without identifying the artist, and VARA
would provide no remedy.9' Worse, the artist could be identified on
postcards where the painting was so badly cropped or the colors so
poorly reproduced that the aesthetic value was ruined.92 Again, the art-
ist would have no relief under VARA.93 Only modification of the origi-
nal work or a limited edition copy would trigger the attribution right.94
83. REPORT, supra note 7, at 15-16 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 15.
85. Id. at 16.
86. Damich, supra note 4, at 959.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3).
88. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-276.
89. REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-18.




94. Id. at 8-277.
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Consequently, while the right of attribution under VARA provides
creators some measure of authorship rights, its scope is limited, and even
then subject to interpretation.
2. The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act
The New York Act also contains an attribution provision, which
appears in section 14.03(2)(a) of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law:
[T]he artist shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or,
for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of such work. The
right to claim authorship shall include the right of the artist to have his
or her name appear on or in connection with such work as the artist.
The right to disclaim authorship shall include the right of the artist to
prevent his or her name from appearing on or in connection with such
work as the artist.
95
Like VARA, the New York Act provides a basic right of attribution,
as well as a right of non-attribution in certain instances. Under the New
York Act, an artist may only disclaim authorship for a "just and valid
reason;" such grounds "shall include that the work has been altered, de-
faced, mutilated or modified other than by the artist, without the artist's
consent, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to re-
sult or has resulted therefrom."96 This language closely parallels
VARA's third attribution right. The two differ in that the New York Act
excepts any modification or mutilation resulting from the passage of
time, whereas VARA places no restriction on the artist's right to disclaim
authorship "in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification
... prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation." '97 Another distinction
is that New York's right of attribution will only attach when: (1) the
original work, or its copy in a limited edition of 300 or fewer, is know-
ingly displayed in public or published in an altered form and (2) such
publication or display indicates or suggests the work is the author's crea-
tion, with resulting damage to his reputation. 9 Again, the federal attri-
bution right allows authors to prevent the use of their names in the event
of any prejudicial alteration, regardless of whether the work was pub-
lished or displayed, or whether the alteration was intentional or
negligent. 99
95. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a).
96. Id.
97. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(a) with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
(The right to prevent intentional distortion or mutilation which harms reputation under
§ 106A(a)(3)(A) is subject to § 106A(c)(1), which excepts alterations caused by the passage of
time.)
98. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(l).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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These limitations on the New York right of attribution only narrow
its scope in the face of the equivalent federal right. As Nimmer notes,
"The fact that the state created right is ...narrower than its federal
counterpart will not save it from preemption."'" Though section 14.01
of the New York Act asserts that "[n]othing ... [herein contained] shall
operate or be construed to conflict with any rights or liabilities under
federal copyright law," 10' preemption is determined by federal rather
than state authority. 0 2 Since, as described above, both cover approxi-
mately the same subject matter, 0 3 most applications of the New York
Act's attribution right will be preempted by VARA.
3. The California Art Preservation Act
California's right of attribution is concisely stated in section 987(d)
of the Civil Code: "The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim
authorship, or for a just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or
her work of fine art.' The California Act gives no indication as to
what constitutes a "just and valid reason" for disclaimer. One commen-
tator predicts that "the exercise of this right ... will be limited to those
situations where the impetus for the artist's desire to disown the work
was an alteration prohibited by the Act."' ' Nimmer speculates that a
"just and valid reason" may encompass uses personally offensive to the
artist as well as defacement, mutilation, or distortion.0 6 If Nimmer is
correct, the California attribution right would slightly outreach its fed-
eral counterpart. VARA limits disclaimer only to instances where physi-
cal change of a work "would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation."'10 7 The author's personal feelings toward the work are
largely ignored.
However, the greater breadth of the California right would not save
it from preemption. Suppose an artist invokes the law to stop the inclu-
sion of his drawing in a display satirizing his artistic style, a use he finds
offensive. He might argue the broader state privilege amounts to a quali-
tatively different right, placing application of the California law beyond
preemption. This argument would probably fail. First, his drawing
100. NIMMER, supra note 12, at 1-13.
101. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.01(5).
102. See U.S. CONST. art IV; 17 U.S.C. § 301(0.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 101; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(9).
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d).
105. John G. Petrovitch, Artists' Statutory "Droit Moral" in California: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 15 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 29, 41 (1981).
106. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-300.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
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would be covered under both VARA and the California Act.° 8 Second,
VARA's drafters indicated that where "a State attempts to grant an au-
thor the rights of attribution... for works of visual art as defined in this
Act, those laws will be preempted .... [T]he new law will preempt a
State law ... even if the State law is broader than Federal law . . ,"'19
Nimmer similarly concludes that, "to the extent that the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 governs, preemption applies."110
4. The Massachusetts Art Preservation Act
Chapter 231, section 85S(d) of the Massachusetts General Laws
contains the following right of attribution:
The artist shall retain the right to claim and receive credit under
his own name or under a reasonable pseudonym or, for just and valid
reason, to disclaim authorship of his work of fine art. Credit shall be
determined in accord with the medium of expression and the nature
and extent of the artist's contribution to the work of fine art.
1 II
This protection exceeds that granted by VARA and the New York and
California Acts. 12 Under the Massachusetts Act, artists have authority
not only to claim authorship, but to receive credit for their works as well.
As Peter Karlen observes, a bare authorship right "has no bite to it.
Anyone can claim authorship, and the artist could have done so before
... [VARA]. To claim authorship all he had to do was hire communica-
tions equipment for use on the street corner. No one could stop him,
assuming that the claim was justified."ll 3 Karlen's description may befit
§ 106A(a)(1) of the amended Copyright Act, which, as noted, appears to
be a hollow privilege.
The Massachusetts attribution rights provision, however, sets forth
various factors to be weighed in determining appropriate credit.' Fur-
ther, the Massachusetts Act expressly permits use of reasonable pseud-
onyms, a privilege granted by classic moral rights, but apparently
omitted by the California and New York Acts, as well as by VARA."'
The Massachusetts right of disclaimer rests on a "just and valid reason"
for exercising it, and "the Massachusetts legislature followed California's
108. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 58.
109. REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
110. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-296.
111. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(d).
112. Compare MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(d) with CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(d)
and N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a) and 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(1),(2).
113. Karlen, supra note 56, at 688.
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(d); see supra text accompanying note I 11.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a); CAL. CIVIL
CODE § 987(d); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 231, § 85S(d).
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example in failing to guide the courts on what just and reasonable cause
might be."'' 6
As with subject matter, the Massachusetts Act gives artists signifi-
cantly greater attribution rights than VARA or the California and New
York Acts." 7 Yet the viability of these rights is unclear. A recognized
Boston artist may create a particularly radical work, but, fearing con-
demnation by Brahmin critics, seek to sign it with an appropriate pseu-
donym rather than her own name. She could argue this right is provided
by the Massachusetts Act, but not by VARA. As a result, application of
the state law would not be preempted.I 8 However, the right to pseudon-
ymous authorship is considered part of the right of attribution for which
VARA makes specific provision.' 1 9 Rather than promulgate a different
privilege, the Massachusetts Act simply establishes a broader version of
the basic attribution right. Consequently, most applications of the Mas-
sachusetts Act, including that of this hypothetical, would likely face pre-
emption.120 The legislative history of § 301 of the Copyright Act is
unambiguous: "The preemption of rights under State law is complete...
even though the scope of exclusive rights given the work under the
[Copyright Act] is narrower . "... ,21 Nimmer concurs: "Suppose the
state created right is broader than its federal counterpart .... Clearly
such a state created right would be the subject of preemption.
1 ,22
Massachusetts law, however, would only be preempted to the extent
its subject matter overlaps with federal law. 123 According to § 301(f)(1)
of the amended Copyright Act, preemption is only triggered by "rights
that are equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with
respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by section 106A
apply .... ,, Since film, audio, and video works are protected by the
Massachusetts Act but not by VARA, they are not works "to which the
rights conferred by section 106A apply."1 25 As a result, the full range of
attribution rights bestowed on such works by Massachusetts should en-
dure. As VARA's legislative history confirms, "[T]he new Federal law
116. Koven, supra note 70, at 106-07.
117. See supra notes 80, 95, 104, 111 and accompanying text.
118. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(2).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 80. Since the right to use a pseudonym is
derivative of the right of attribution, the Massachusetts right is equivalent to the federal attri-
bution right, and is preempted.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 18, 80, 111.
121. NIMMER, supra note 12, at 1-12 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
131 (1976)) (alteration in original).
122. Id.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0; see supra text accompanying note 18.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1) (emphasis added).
125. Id.
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will not preempt State causes of action relating to works that are not
covered by the law .... 26
C. The Right of Integrity
1. The Visual Artists Rights Act
Under classical moral rights, the right of integrity protects not only
the physical condition of an artwork, but also its portrayal and use.'
12 7
Any "derogatory action in relation to" the work which could harm the
artist's honor or reputation is barred under the Berne Convention.
128
Given the Convention's respect for artists' rights, 129 such "derogatory
action" might include uses that demean the artwork or belittle its
creator.
The right of integrity under VARA is more limited and focuses on
the material aspects of the work:
(a) ... the author of a work of visual art-
(3) ... shall have the right-
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modifi-
cation of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification
of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and
any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a viola-
tion of that right. 
13
0
The right of integrity under VARA has certain restrictions and ex-
ceptions.1 3 1 First, any alteration must be intentional; artists are not em-
powered to prevent negligent distortion, mutilation or modification of
their works.13 2 VARA originally provided otherwise, but was changed
during mark-up. 3 3 The decision to make the change may have stemmed
from pressure by art traders, who realized the potential for accidental or
inadvertent handling of artwork. The legislative history notes that "[tihe
right[ ] of... integrity.., in no way interfere[s] with ordinary commerce
126. REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
127. Damich, supra note 4, at 949 (quoting Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886 (last revised July 24, 1971), re-
printed in World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act 1971) (1978), art. 6bis, para. 1 at 41).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
131. Some exceptions to the federal right of integrity include modification caused by the
passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials, or by conservation, or public display
unless conducted with gross negligence. Id. § 106A(c)(1), (2).
132. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) allows artists to disclaim authorship of negligently dis-
torted works.
133. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-278 n.148 (citing 136 CONG. REC. H13313 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
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in works of art by art dealers, auction houses, and others similarly situ-
ated."' 34 The right of integrity under VARA is also limited to those
modifications that harm the artist's "honor and reputation."' 35 As dis-
cussed earlier, this standard is somewhat vague.' 36  According to
VARA's drafters, "The Committee believes that the best approach to
construing the term 'honor or reputation'. . . is to focus on the artistic or
professional honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the
work that is protected."' 37 The Committee concludes that the test "must
of necessity be flexible."'
' 38
The right against destruction provided by § 106A(a)(3)(B) is ambig-
uous. This right applies only to works of "recognized stature," a phrase
open to inconsistent interpretation. Presumably, a court would consult
those knowledgeable in the field to determine whether a work possessed
the requisite status, but a per se rule is probably inappropriate. 39 The
language may be intended to preclude such scenarios as "a doting mother
... su[ing] her child's kindergarten teacher for throwing out her child's
finger-painting."'" However, the effect is to leave unrecognized authors
without a remedy under the amended Copyright Act for the destruction
of their works.' 4 '
Another uncertainty lies in VARA's treatment of negligent or inten-
tional destruction of artwork. Section 106A(a)(3)(B) of the amended
Copyright Act gives authors the right to prevent any destruction, but
then provides that only "intentional or grossly negligent" destruction is a
violation of the right of integrity.'42 As a result, authors are apparently
empowered to enjoin impending destruction of their works, regardless of
the destroyers' mindsets, but can only recover damages for intentional or
grossly negligent destruction. 4 3 Further, authors might recover for de-
stroyed works whether or not their reputations were harmed.'I" Yet this
reading of § 106A(a)(3)(B) is inconsistent with § 106A(a)(3)(A), which
134. REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
137. REPORT, supra note 7, at 15.
138. Id.
139. Since each work is different, a case-by-case approach would be most reasonable.
140. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-278 n.154 (quoting L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1990, at BI0
(quoting Hirshhorn Museum deputy director)).
141. Id. at 8-279.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
143. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-279.
144. Damich, supra note 4, at 961.
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only prevents mutilation and distortion if the artist's reputation is at
stake. 45
Perhaps destruction, as opposed to mere distortion of artwork, justi-
fies the more powerful remedy. According to VARA's legislative history,
[T]he right of integrity extends only to intentional and negligent
acts or omissions, and . . . those acts or omissions must have been
committed with respect to the work at issue .... [W]hile an author
may assert the integrity right where his or her work is destroyed in a
fire caused for the purpose of collecting insurance on the work, the
author may not assert the right where the fire is caused by someone
accidentally forgetting to turn off a coffee pot.
14 6
In the first sentence, the drafters endorsed a right of integrity for both
intentional and negligent acts, but in the last sentence appear to distin-
guish the two. Perhaps they viewed the failure to turn off a coffee pot as
something other than negligence, despite implying a lack of reasonable
care. In any event, Nimmer's suggestion that artists are authorized to
enjoin any demolition, but can only recover damages for intentional de-
struction, seems the most logical interpretation.
147
2. The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act
The New York right of integrity is found in section 14.03(1) of the
Arts and Cultural Affairs Law:
[N]o person other than the artist or a person acting with the art-
ist's consent shall knowingly display in a place accessible to the public
or publish a work of fine art or limited edition multiple of not more
than three hundred copies by that artist or a reproduction thereof in an
altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if the work is displayed,
published or reproduced as being the work of the artist, or under cir-
cumstances under which it would reasonably be regarded as being the
work of the artist, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably
likely to result therefrom, except that this section shall not apply to
sequential imagery such as that in motion pictures.
148
This statute provides an extremely limited right of integrity. Rather than
protecting art from distortion or mutilation in any context, the New
York Act only provides protection where: (1) the work is promoted or
could be regarded as the artist's work and (2) damage to the artist's repu-
145. Id. at 961-62. The inconsistency might be resolved by considering that destruction is
the worst possible fate of a piece of recognized artwork, and that it must be prevented at all
costs. Thus, § 106A(a)(3)(B) offers a complete bar against such action. On the other hand, the
"mere" distortion of art that may or may not be "of recognized stature" is not as serious an
offense, and is only actionable if the author's reputation is damaged as a result. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a)(3)(A), (B).
146. REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.
147. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-279.
148. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1).
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tation is reasonably likely.149 This language suggests one could escape
liability by privately defacing artwork, or by publicly distorting it with-
out identifying the author.150 Exceptions to the New York Act's cover-
age include alteration through the passage of time or the "inherent
nature of the materials," as well as non-negligent conservation of the art-
work.15' Accidental modification in any other context is apparently not
tolerated, at least in terms of public exhibition.
Application of the New York integrity right faces preemption in
most cases.1 52 The New York law, unlike VARA, cannot be used to pre-
vent destruction, 153 and is more narrow in that it only blocks modifica-
tion of works for public display.'54 Its provision barring alterations
harmful to the artist's reputation coincides closely with that of VARA. 1 5
As a result, application of the New York right of integrity to subject
matter covered by both statutes is probably preempted.' 56
The only instance where application of New York's right of integ-
rity might endure is if the author sought to bar the public display of a
work modified by accident. While the integrity right created by VARA
prohibits destruction, its provision against alteration is limited to "inten-
tional distortion, mutilation, or . . . modification."' 57 In the event of
accidental modification, the author might use the federal attribution
right to prevent the use of his name on the artwork, 58 and doing so
should not affect the author's New York integrity right.
Generally, however, application of the New York Act would be sub-
sumed by VARA. As a federal district court noted before VARA's pas-
sage, "If enacted . . . [t]his amendment to the Copyright Act would
arguably preempt state laws such as the New York Artists' Authorship
Rights Act which currently provide similar rights .. "'5'
149. Id.
150. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-298 & 8-299.
151. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(a)-(c).
152. See supra text accompanying note 18.
153. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1) with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B);
see supra text accompanying note 130.
154. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1).
155. See supra text accompanying note 130.
156. See supra text accompanying note 18.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
159. Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 136 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Although this case involved the unauthorized use of fragments of an artist's work, the court's
reasoning would extend to nearly any other application as well.
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3. The California Arts Preservation Act
In California, the moral right of integrity is contained in section
987(c) of the Civil Code:
(1) No person, except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine
art which the artist has created, shall intentionally commit, or author-
ize the intentional commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art.
(2) In addition to the prohibitions contained in paragraph (1), no
person who frames, conserves, or restores a work of fine art shall com-
mit, or authorize the commission of, any physical defacement, mutila-
tion, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art by any act
constituting gross negligence. For the purposes of this section, the
term "gross negligence" shall mean the exercise of so slight a degree of
care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the particu-
lar work of fine art.'
16
The California Act is broad in that its prohibition against alteration
of fine art is not conditioned on the potential loss of reputation. While
the preamble in Civil Code section 987(a) notes that "the physical altera-
tion or destruction of fine art . . . is detrimental to the artist's reputa-
tion," ' 6' exercise of the right of integrity does not require any such
finding. 62 The statute is narrow in that it only protects works of "recog-
nized quality," perhaps shutting out the grievances of novice artists.
63
Further, only intentional alteration, defacement or destruction is covered
by the California Act, even though grossly negligent conservation, resto-
ration or framing will also bring liability.'6,
The integrity right conferred by the California Act generally paral-
lels that granted by VARA. Although, unlike VARA, the California
right provides complete protection against alteration, it can still be
deemed an equivalent right for the purpose of most applications. 65 As
related by VARA's drafters, "[T]he new law will preempt a State law
granting the right of integrity ... even if the State law is broader than
Federal law, such as by providing a right ... of integrity with respect to
covered works without regard to injury to the author's honor or reputa-
tion.'166 Nimmer similarly concludes, "Is the California Art Preserva-
tion Act invalid by reason of federal preemption arising from the
160. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c).
161. Id. § 987(a).
162. Id. § 987(c)(1).
163. Id. § 987(b)(2).
164. Id. § 987(c).
165. Compare CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1) with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3); see supra text
accompanying note 20.
166. REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (emphasis added).
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Copyright Act?... [T]o the extent that the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 governs [i.e., after June 1, 1991], preemption applies."
167
4. The Massachusetts Art Preservation Act
The Massachusetts right of integrity is found in chapter 231, section
85S(c) of the Massachusetts General Laws:
No person, except an artist who owns or possesses a work of fine
art which the artist has created, shall intentionally commit, or author-
ize the intentional commission of any physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art. As used in this section,
intentional physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction
includes any such action taken deliberately or through gross
negligence. 8
The Massachusetts right of integrity closely follows the California
right, except that the Massachusetts Act equates gross negligence with
intentional defacement or destruction of artwork. 169 Like the right of
integrity in other American statutes, the Massachusetts right only covers
physical distortion of a work. However, one commentator questions
whether the modifier "physical" applies to the series of destructive acts
mentioned by the Massachusetts Act.17° In terms of preemption, the
right of integrity granted by the Massachusetts Act is approximately the
same as that bestowed by VARA, and therefore the application of the
Massachusetts Act would be subsumed to the extent of the subject matter
overlap. 71 In regard to film, audio and video works protected solely by
the Massachusetts Act, 172 however, there would be no preemption.
D. Duration of Rights
1. The Visual Artists Rights Act
VARA's duration provision appears at § 106A(d) of the amended
Copyright Act:
(d) Duration of rights-
(1) With respect to works of visual art created on or after [June 1,
1991] . . . the rights conferred by subsection (a) [i.e., attribution and
integrity] shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.
(2) With respect to works of visual art created before [June 1, 1991]
... but title to which has not, as of [June 1, 1991 ] ... been transferred
from the author, the rights conferred by subsection (a) shall be coex-
167. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-296.
168. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(c).
169. Compare CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1) with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231,
§ 85s(c).
170. Koven, supra note 70, at 107.
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3); see also supra text accompanying note 18.
172. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b).
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tensive with, and expire at the same time as, the rights conferred by
section 106 [i.e., standard copyright privileges].17
The most striking aspect of § 106A(d)(1) is its limitation of moral
rights to the life of the author, as opposed to traditional copyright protec-
tion, which lasts fifty years past the author's death.17 4 For those works
of visual art created prior to VARA's effective date, subsection (2) pro-
vides standard copyright duration so long as title is held by the author.' 75
Where title was transferred before VARA's implementation, the statute is
silent and there is no apparent protection. 17 6 Thus, VARA's focus is gen-
erally prospective. Its drafters asserted that "acts that would otherwise
violate the right of integrity but that occurred before the effective date
will not give rise to a cause of action . . ,""' While the legislative
history makes no express reference to attribution right violations, Nim-
mer speculates that "given the general doctrine that copyright statutes do
not apply retroactively, it would seem that those too are nonactionable
"178
Section 106A(d)(3) provides that protection of joint works extends
through the life of the last surviving author. 179 In any case, these rights
will "run to the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise
expire." 18 0
2 The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act
The duration of moral rights granted by the New York Act is some-
what uncertain. Section 14.03 of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law,
which contains the limited attribution and integrity rights, lacks any in-
dication of their spans.18 1 Perhaps a "life of the author" limitation is
implied, since the statute continually specifies "the artist" rather than a
more general "holder of rights." '182 However, VARA, the California and
Massachusetts Acts also use the terms "artist" or "author" and address
duration in separate subsections.' 8 3
173. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1), (2).
174. Id. § 302(a)
175. Id. § 106A(d)(2).
176. Id.
177. REPORT, supra note 7, at 23.
178. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-287.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(3).
180. Id. § 106A(d)(4).
181. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1), (2)(a).
182. See generally N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01(l), 14.03(1), (2).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a), (d); CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(1), (g)(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b).
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According to various commentators, New York's rights of attribu-
tion and integrity last merely for the life of the author. 184 A student
commentator notes that the New York Act's "statutory ban on public
display of an altered work should deter abusive treatment and thereby
protect artists, but ... [t]he prohibition, however, exists only during the
lifetime of the artist."'8 5 Though on point, this commentator was ana-
lyzing an earlier version of the New York law, which was repealed,
amended, and recodified in its present form.'8 6 Still, the new version
largely reflects the old, so arguably the conclusion remains valid. Vance
Koven concurs in this appraisal. In discussing the duration of moral
rights in other jurisdictions, he observes that "[tihe New York Act con-
tains no explicit limitation, but appears to provide for the assertion of
rights only by the artist, so that his or her death would cut off relief."' 87
Assuming the New York rights last only for the life of the author,
application of this durational privilege may face federal preemption.
Since the span of rights granted by VARA and the New York Act are the
same, exercise of New York law would be subsumed if the subject matter
involved qualifies as a "work of visual art" under § 101 of the amended
Copyright Act.' Applications stemming from violations prior to June
1, 1991, however, would escape preemption.189  According to
§ 301(f)(2)(A) of the amended Copyright Act, "Nothing in paragraph (1)
[preemption provision] annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to ... any cause of
action from undertakings commenced before the effective date.., of the
Visual Artists Rights Act." In any event, the New York Act could not
be used against the mutilation or misattribution of an artist's work after
death.
3. The California Art Preservation Act
The duration of moral rights in California is addressed in section
987(g)(1) of the Civil Code, which asserts: "The rights and duties cre-
ated under this section .. .[s]hall, with respect to the artist, or if any
artist is deceased, his or her heir, beneficiary, devisee, or personal repre-
sentative, exist until the 50th anniversary of the death of the artist."' 90
This protection applies to any claims brought for violation of rights cre-
ated by the California Act on or after January 1, 1980, regardless of a
184. See infra text accompanying notes 185, 187.
185. Smith, supra note 49, at 172.
186. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 8-298 n.328.
187. Koven, supra note 70, at 103.
188. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1).
189. Id. § 301(f)(2)(A).
190. CAL. CIV. CODE § 9 8 7(g)(1).
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work's creation date.99 For works created after June 1, 1991, rights
under the California Act are broader than those under VARA, extending
protection for fifty years after the author's death.I92 However, for those
works created before June 1, 1991, where title remains with the author,
VARA adopts the traditional copyright duration of fifty years, and
VARA and the California Act parallel each other. 193
At least in terms of duration of rights, application of the California
Act would escape preemption. Where VARA merely provides rights
during the author's life, preemption is barred under § 301 (f)(2)(C) of the
amended Copyright Act, which states that "[n]othing in paragraph (1)
[preemption provision] annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law of statutes of any State with respect to ... activities violat-
ing legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of the au-
thor."' 94 Further, where VARA and the California Act provide the same
duration of rights, § 301(f)(2)(C) still bars preemption despite VARA's
own provision of protection "beyond the life of the author."' 9'
4. The Massachusetts Art Preservation Act
The Massachusetts duration provision is found in chapter 231, sec-
tion 85S(g) of the Massachusetts General Laws, which declares that
"[t]he provisions of this section shall, with respect to the artist, or if any
artist is deceased, his heir, legatee, or personal representative, continue
until the fiftieth anniversary of the death of such artist .... 196 As with
the California Act, preemption will not apply to the application of the
Massachusetts duration term. Again, VARA bars preemption of "any
rights ... under the . . . statutes of any State with respect to ... activities
violating legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of the
author."' 9 7 Even where § 106A(d)(2) of the amended Copyright Act au-
thorizes a "life plus fifty year" term under § 302(a), exercise of the Mas-
sachusetts provision would endure. 19
III
Conclusion
Section 301(f) of the amended Copyright Act authorizes preemption
of any equivalent state right applying to subject matter covered by this
191. Id. § 987(j); Karlen, supra note 56, at 721.
192. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
193. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(d)(2), 302(a).
194. Id. § 301(f)(2)(C).
195. Id.
196. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(g).
197. 17 U.S.C. § 301(O(2)(C).
198. Id.
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act. Preemption of a particular application of state law depends on satis-
fying a two-part test: (1) the state right must be "equivalent" to a federal
right, and (2) must be invoked to protect a work covered by VARA.
Since VARA's legislative history defines "equivalent right" with great
breadth, and the federal and state laws both provide basic integrity and
attribution rights, the state-created rights are unavoidably equivalent to
the federal rights. While these privileges may differ in scope, VARA's
drafters elected to reject such variation as a basis for distinction. Instead,
they viewed the federal rights as preempting state rights of the same gen-
eral character.
The enactment of VARA resulted in the loss of some unique state-
based rights. Artists may well have relied on such provisions as the Cali-
fornia Act's right to integrity, which is not conditioned on a demonstra-
ble "loss of reputation." Further, where paintings, sculptures, prints or
drawings are concerned, the Massachusetts Act provides broad integrity
rights protection, barring grossly negligent as well as intentional distor-
tion. VARA has preempted application of these state rights.
A state-based moral rights law can only avoid preemption when ap-
plied to subject matter beyond VARA's scope. This is the case with the
Massachusetts Act, which extends moral rights to film, audio and video
works. At the same time, however, the protection accorded to paintings,
sculptures, prints, and drawings by Massachusetts will fail because state-
based rights are still preempted where VARA and the state law share
common subject matter.
Despite the occasional loss of unique state rights, VARA is a signifi-
cant breakthrough for American artists. It represents the first national
moral rights legislation and establishes a uniform foundation for the ap-
plication of these rights. Rather than working around VARA, state legis-
lators should forward initiatives to Congress so VARA can be clarified
and amended to meet the needs of artists in the future.
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